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I. INTRODUCTION
The European Court of Human Rights has stated that the tenets of
Islamic sharia1 law are “incompatible with the fundamental principles of

1. The word “sharia” is transliterated from Arabic and, thus, has various possible English
spellings, including “sharia,” “shariah,” “shari’a,” and “shari’ah.” Additionally, it is sometimes
capitalized as a proper noun (e.g. “Sharia,” “Shari’ah,” etc.). This Comment will employ the term
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democracy.”2
Former Speaker of the United States House of
Representatives and one-time presidential candidate Newt Gingrich has
characterized it as a “mortal threat to the survival of freedom in the United
States and in the world as we know it.”3 Countries that claim to be governed
by the provisions of sharia employ criminal punishments that can only be
described as cruel and barbaric: the amputation of hands and feet on the
opposite sides of the body for crimes such as “highway robbery;”4
imprisonment or death by stoning for the “crime” of adultery;5 flogging for
the “sin” of drinking alcohol;6 and “eye-for-an-eye” retribution in kind for
all manner of injuries.7 To millions across the globe, however, sharia law
has a far more benign and spiritual meaning; for these devout Muslims, the
tenets of the sharia are a source of comfort and inspiration, the basis of a

“sharia,” in the lower case, except in instances where alternative spellings of the word are used in
proper titles or quotations.
2. Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) v. Turkey, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 267, 312.
3. Scott Shane, In Islamic Law, Gingrich Sees a Mortal Threat to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21,
2011, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/us/politics/in-shariah-gingrich-seesmortal-threat-to-us.html?pagewanted=all.
4. Six Bedouin men in Saudi Arabia were sentenced to this form of “cross-amputation” in late
2011 for the crime of highway robbery. Saudi Arabia: King Urged to Commute ‘Cross Amputation’
Sentences, AMNESTY INT’L (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/saudi-arabia-kingurged-commute-cross-amputation-sentences-2011-12-16.
5. In late 2011, many newspapers around the world carried the story of an Afghan rape victim
known only as Gulnaz, who was imprisoned under Afghanistan’s strict adultery laws and was only
released due to the personal intervention of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, allegedly on the
condition that she marry her rapist. Jean MacKenzie, Gulnaz: Afghan Rape Victim May Be Forced
to
Marry
Attacker,
GLOBAL
POST
(Dec.
19,
2011,
6:00
AM),
http://web2.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/afghanistan/111218/gulnaz-afghanrape-victim. The Iranian Penal Code, on the other hand, stipulates that adulterers should be partially
buried—a male adulterer up to his waist, and a female adulterer up to her chest—and stoned to death
with stones approximately the size of tangerines. Christopher Beam, How Does Stoning Work in
Iran?,
SLATE
(Aug.
2,
2010,
6:34
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2010/08/how_does_stoning_work_in_ira
n.html.
6. Drinking alcohol is one of many crimes punishable by flogging under Sudan’s shariainspired laws. Robert Mackey, Flogging Video Sparks Protest in Sudan, N.Y. TIMES LEDE BLOG
(Dec. 15, 2010, 2:10 PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/15/flogging-video-sparksprotest-in-sudan/.
7. In the summer of 2010, a Saudi judge reportedly sought to punish a criminal, who had
paralyzed his victim during an assault with a meat cleaver, with paralysis by having a hospital
surgically damage his spinal cord. Saudi Judge ‘Asks Hospital to Paralyse Man as Punishment,’
TELEGRAPH
(London)
(Aug.
20,
2010,
12:33
AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/saudiarabia/7955393/Saudi-judge-askshospital-to-paralyse-man-as-punishment.html. In a similar incident out of Iran, a man convicted of
throwing acid into the face of a woman who had spurned his marriage proposal was sentenced to be
blinded by having acid dripped into his eyes. Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Iran to Blind Criminal with
Acid in ‘Eye for an Eye’ Justice, GUARDIAN (London) (May 13, 2011, 1:56 PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/13/iran-blind-criminal-acid.
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divinely-inspired, objective morality that provides meaning and direction to
their lives.8
Over the past decade, interest in, and fear of, Islamic sharia law has
grown immeasurably in the United States.9 This interest, and this fear, can
largely be traced to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,10 when
Americans were confronted with a radical ideology—al-Qaeda’s brand of
violent, jihadist Islamism—that purported to represent the true face of Islam,
a religion in which, prior to the attacks, comparatively few non-Muslim
Americans had demonstrated any significant level of interest. In the
aftermath of the September 11 attacks, politicians, experts, and ordinary
citizens struggled to make sense of what had happened, and what role, if
any, the religious tenets of Islam had played in the attack. Some, including
President George W. Bush, insisted that al-Qaeda’s murderous ideology was
wholly divorced from the peaceful nature of the Islamic religion.11 Others,
however, darkly insinuated that Islam itself could be inherently violent—and
that many of the United States’ Muslim citizens were, effectively, acting as a
fifth column bent on the “Islamization” of America.12
The latter view has, particularly in the past several years, captured the
imagination of large swathes of the American public.13 Jolted by the doom-

8. See MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, SHARI’AH LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 2–7 (2008).
9. As a point of reference, searches of the databases of three major United States newspapers—
the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times—reveal that press reports
from the early 2000s discuss sharia in reference to foreign affairs in such countries as Afghanistan,
Iran, and Nigeria. However, press reports concerning the possible application of sharia law in the
United States did not begin to be published until the latter part of the decade, as a number of
books—including BAT YE’OR, EURABIA: THE EURO-ARAB AXIS (2005); MARK STEYN, AMERICA
ALONE: THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT (2006); BRUCE BAWER, WHILE EUROPE SLEPT:
HOW RADICAL ISLAM IS DESTROYING THE WEST FROM WITHIN (2007); and MELANIE PHILLIPS,
LONDONISTAN (2007)—began to popularize the idea that Islamists were infiltrating the West and
seeking to undermine its institutions.
10. Heather L. Weaver, 9/11’s Legacy of Religious Discrimination, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION
(Sept. 15, 2011, 4:23 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-religion-belief/911s-legacyreligious-discrimination.
11. Just one week after the September 11 attacks, President Bush visited a Washington, D.C.
mosque, stating that “[t]he face of terror is not the true faith of Islam” and that “Islam is peace.”
Dana Milbank & Emily Wax, Bush Visits Mosque to Forestall Hate Crimes, WASH. POST, Sept. 18,
2001,
at
A01,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn?pagename=article&node=nation/specials/attacked&contentId=A46832-2001Sep17.
12. Daniel Pipes, The Danger Within: Militant Islam in America, DANIELPIPES.ORG (Nov.
2001), http://www.danielpipes.org/77/the-danger-within-militant-islam-in-america.
13. See generally ROBERT P. JONES ET AL., BROOKINGS INST. & PUB. POL’Y RESEARCH INST.,
WHAT IT MEANS TO BE AN AMERICAN: ATTITUDES IN AN INCREASINGLY DIVERSE AMERICA TEN
YEARS AFTER 9/11 (2011) http://publicreligion.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/PRRIBrookings-What-it-Means-to-be-American-Report.pdf.
This report, based on a poll jointly
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saying of bloggers,14 cable news and radio pundits,15 and politicians16—
unnerved by high-profile, controversial events involving MuslimAmericans, such as the Fort Hood shooting and the debate concerning the
“Ground Zero” Mosque—non-Muslim Americans seem to be increasingly
divided and confused about their Muslim-American neighbors, Islam in
general, and sharia law in particular.17 A recent poll conducted by the
Brookings Institute and the Public Policy Research Institute, for instance,
found that almost half of the American public believes the religion of Islam
to be at odds with American values, and nearly a third believes that MuslimAmericans want to establish sharia law in the United States.18
In response to this rising concern about sharia law, as well as a
scattering of much-touted cases in which sharia was allegedly applied in
United States courts,19 nearly two dozen states have considered measures to
conducted by the Brookings Institution and the Public Policy Research Institute, revealed that, as of
August 2011, approximately 30% of the American public believes that Muslim-Americans want to
establish sharia law in America; that approximately 47% of the American public believes that Islam
is at odds with American values; and that significant minorities of Americans are “uncomfortable”
with certain aspects of Islam. Id. at 10, 11, 14, 18.
14. Such as Robert Spencer—the operator of Jihad Watch, a blog dedicated to “bringing public
attention to the role that jihad theology and ideology play in the modern world and to correcting
popular misconceptions about the role of jihad and religion in modern-day conflicts,” and the author
of several books that are highly critical of Islam, including The Complete Infidel’s Guide to the
Koran and The Truth About Muhammad: Founder of the World’s Most Intolerant Religion—and
Pamela Geller—the operator of the right-wing blog Atlas Shrugs and an outspoken critic of Islam.
Robert Spencer, Why Jihad Watch?, JIHAD WATCH, http://www.jihadwatch.org/why-jihadwatch.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2013); Pamela Geller, NY Times Con Job: “Daisy Khan Had Never
Seen So Many Jews in Her Life,” ATLAS SHRUGS (Nov. 14, 2010, 5:25 PM),
http://atlasshrugs2000.typepad.com/atlas_shrugs/2010/11/new-york-times-con-job-daisy-khan-hadnever-seen-so-many-jews-in-her-life.html [hereinafter Geller, NY Times Con Job] (stating that Islam
is “the most antisemitic, genocidal ideology in the world”).
15. Such as conservative radio personality and former television pundit Glenn Beck, who
periodically speaks about what he perceives to be the dangers of radical Islam and sharia law. See
Glenn Beck, What Would Life Be Like Under Sharia Law?, GLENNBECK.COM, (Sept. 30, 2011, 9:04
AM), http://www.glennbeck.com/2011/09/30/what-would-life-be-like-under-sharia-law/.
16. Such as Newt Gingrich. See Shane, supra note 3.
17. See JONES ET AL., supra note 13, at 10–16.
18. Id. at 10–11.
19. Fifty such cases from twenty-three states are outlined in one anti-sharia publication released
by the Center for Security Policy. CTR. FOR SECURITY POL’Y, SHARIA LAW AND AMERICAN STATE
COURTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF STATE APPELLATE COURT CASES 54–606 (2011), available at
http://shariahinamericancourts.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Sharia_Law_And_American_State
_Courts_1.4_06212011.pdf. Perhaps the most frequently cited case by those who seek to
demonstrate the alleged “threat” of sharia law is the now-infamous New Jersey case of S.D. v.
M.J.R., in which a trial court judge ruled that a Muslim husband, based on his religious beliefs
regarding the rights of a husband and the subservient role of a wife, lacked the requisite criminal
intent to have committed sexual assault and criminal sexual contact—even though the evidence was
sufficiently established for the judge to also decide that acts which would otherwise have constituted
such crimes had, in fact, occurred. 415 N.J. Super. 417, 427–29, 431 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2010). Although the case was promptly overturned on appeal, id. at 432–39, anti-sharia advocates
allege that the trial court’s ruling demonstrates the erosion of American values in the courtroom and
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ban the application of sharia in their respective state judicial systems.20
Among these states, however, it was Oklahoma that caused the debate about
anti-sharia measures to explode onto the national scene, when, in the 2010
general election, the citizens of Oklahoma passed a ballot initiative, State
Question 755 (“SQ 755”), intended to insert a ban on the application of
sharia law into the text of the Oklahoma Constitution.21 The initiative was
immediately challenged by Muneer Awad, a Muslim citizen of Oklahoma,
who asserted that the certification of SQ 755 and its incorporation into
Oklahoma’s constitution would violate the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution.22 The Federal District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma agreed with Awad, issuing a preliminary injunction preventing
the certification of SQ 755, and, in January 2012, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the district court’s ruling on the likely unconstitutionality of
the initiative.23 Awad v. Ziriax was the first case in which an American court
ruled on the constitutionality of an attempt to ban or limit Islamic sharia
law, and both the district and appellate courts firmly ruled that Oklahoma’s
attempt violated the United States Constitution.24
In the wake of the Awad judgment, however, confusion about and
animosity toward sharia law remain: right-wing proponents of banning
sharia reacted to the Tenth Circuit’s decision with dismay,25 and other states
the steady, if slow, willingness of United States courts to accept culturally-based legal arguments in
contravention of American legal norms. See Cully Stimson, The Real Impact of Sharia Law in
America, THE FOUNDRY (Sept. 2, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://blog.heritage.org/2010/09/02/the-realimpact-of-sharia-law-in-america/; Robert Spencer, Sharia in New Jersey: Muslim Husband Rapes
Wife, Judge Sees No Sexual Assault Because Islam Forbids Wives to Refuse Sex, JIHAD WATCH
(July 24, 2010, 6:20 AM), http://www.jihadwatch.org/2010/07/sharia-in-new-jersey-muslimhusband-rapes-wife-judge-sees-no-sexual-assault-because-husbands-religio.html.
20. See Bill Raftery, Bans on Court Use of Sharia/International Law: Law in Arizona, Bills
Advance in Missouri and Texas, Failing in Most States, GAVEL TO GAVEL: A REVIEW OF STATE
LEGISLATION AFFECTING THE COURTS (May 3, 2011), http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2011/05/03/banson-court-use-of-shariainternational-law-law-in-arizona-bills-advance-in-missouri-and-texas-failingin-most-states/. The states that have considered legislation that would bar consideration of sharia
law include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. The vast majority of this legislation has since
failed. Id.
21. Andy Barr, Oklahoma Bans Sharia Law, POLITICO (Nov. 3, 2010, 8:26 AM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1110/44630.html.
22. Complaint Seeking a Temp. Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 6–8, Awad v.
Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (No. CIV-10-1186-M).
23. E.g., Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012), aff’g 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1305–08
(W.D. Okla. 2010).
24. Id.
25. Pamela Geller, see note 14, for instance, responded to the Awad decision by writing: “It’s

699

05 GRUNERT SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/2/13 3:11 PM

have not ceased their attempts to prevent the application of sharia in their
respective judicial systems.26 As fears of “Islamization” in the United States
and, particularly, in United States courts, continue to percolate, this
Comment seeks to examine the issues raised by the Awad decision in order
to shed greater light on the titular question of sharia law in America. This
Comment contends that the Awad judgment was correctly decided, that the
most commonly-objected-to aspects of sharia law are already prohibited
under existing American constitutional and civil law, and that Oklahoma’s—
and other states’—attempts to ban sharia law are not only unconstitutional,
but would, if enacted, have profound and negative implications for the
United States’ continuing struggle against radical Islamist terrorism.
Part II of this Comment discusses the events that provided the prelude to
the original district court decision in Awad.27 Part III provides a background
on the religo-cultural and constitutional legal issues involved in the Awad
case and in the discussion of sharia law in America more generally.28 Part
III.A examines Islamic sharia law itself, describing what sharia is, where it
comes from, and, briefly, how it has developed since the founding of Islam.29
Part III.B describes the First Amendment constitutional jurisprudence that
was relevant to the district court’s and the Tenth Circuit’s examination of the
Awad case—specifically, the jurisprudential background to the First
Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.30
Part IV describes the procedural history of the Awad case to date,
examining, in Part IV.A, the district court’s judgment in the case and then, in
Part IV.B, the Tenth Circuit’s decision affirming the district court’s
holding.31 Part V analyzes why the two courts in Awad reached the correct
legal result, discussing not only the First Amendment argument that

not religious law, sharia is political law. How can anyone oppose a law that seeks to prevent foreign
laws from undermining fundamental constitutional liberties?”
Geller, Sharia Law Ban
Unconstitutional,
ATLAS
SHRUGS
(Jan.
10,
2012,
2:53
PM),
http://atlasshrugs2000.typepad.com/atlas_shrugs/2012/01/sharia-law-ban-unconstitutional.html.
26. For instance, legislation preventing the application of “foreign law” was signed into law in
Arizona in 2011. Bill Raftery, 2011 Year in Review: Banning Courts from Using Sharia
Law/International Law, GAVEL TO GAVEL: A REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION AFFECTING THE
COURTS (Dec. 27, 2011), http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2011/12/27/2011-year-in-review-banningcourts-from-using-sharia-lawinternational-law/. Arizona’s legislation was based on draft legislation
created by the American Public Policy Alliance known as the “American Law for American Courts;”
in addition to its application in Arizona, American Laws for American Courts legislation has also
been signed into law in Tennessee and Louisiana. American Laws for American Courts
Accomplishes What the Oklahoma Amendment Has Not, CHRISTIAN NEWSWIRE (Jan. 12, 2012),
http://www.christiannewswire.com/news/3803818647.html.
27. See infra notes 38–51 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 52–144 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 52–101 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 102–44 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 145–70 and accompanying text.
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provided the courts’ central basis for enjoining SQ 755’s certification, but
also the over-arching constitutional and policy reasons that demonstrate the
futility and even danger inherent in attempts to ban sharia law.32 Part V.A
briefly affirms the First Amendment analysis of the two Awad courts.33 Part
V.B argues that, even if sharia law was truly as terrible, misogynistic, and
discriminatory as its critics claim, current constitutional protections and civil
laws would already outlaw the most pernicious aspects of sharia, making
sharia bans like SQ 755 redundant.34 Finally, Part V.C asserts that, from a
purely policy-oriented perspective, attempts to ban sharia law in the United
States are counter-productive and actually hinder the United States’ goal of
marginalizing and defeating radical Islamists.35 Part VI examines the impact
that the Awad decision has had on state attempts to ban or limit sharia law.36
Part VII concludes this Comment.37
II. BACKGROUND
The series of events that would culminate in the Awad judgment began
in the spring of 2010, when the Oklahoma Legislature passed Enrolled
House Joint Resolution 1056 (EHJR 1056), also known as the “Save Our
State” amendment.38 Described as a “pre-emptive strike against [s]haria law
coming to Oklahoma” by State Representative Rex Duncan, its primary
author,39 EHJR 1056 proposed the amendment of Oklahoma’s constitution to
prevent Oklahoma courts from considering international or Islamic sharia
law in their judicial decisions.40 In order to comply with the amendment

32. See infra notes 171–218 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 172–84 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 185–98 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 199–218 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 219–29 and accompanying text.
37. See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
38. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir. 2012); Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d
1298, 1301–02 (2010).
39. Mark Schlachtenhaufen, Sharia Law, Courts Likely on 2010 Ballot, EDMUND SUN (June 4,
2010), http://www.edmondsun.com/local/x1996914371/Sharia-law-courts-likely-on-2010-ballot.
40. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1302. Specifically, the EHJR 1056 called for the addition of
the following sub-section to Section 1 of Article VII of the Oklahoma Constitution:
C. The Courts provided for in subsection A of this section when exercising their
judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the United States
Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto, established common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and rules
promulgated pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law of another state of the United
States provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in making judicial
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provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution, the adoption of EHJR 1056 by the
Oklahoma Legislature required that the joint resolution be submitted to the
public for approval at the next general election.41 This constitutional
requirement led to the creation of State Question 755 (SQ 755), a ballot
initiative incorporating the language of the “Save Our State” amendment,
which was to be put to the vote of Oklahoma’s citizens during the general
election on November 2, 2010.42
Although a legal technicality threatened to scuttle SQ 755 during the
course of its certification by the Oklahoma Attorney General and Secretary
of State,43 the final text of the ballot initiative eventually read as follows:
This measure amends the State Constitution. It changes a section
that deals with the courts of this state. It would amend Article 7,
Section 1. It makes courts rely on federal and state law when
deciding cases. It forbids courts from considering or using
international law. It forbids courts from considering or using Sharia
Law.
International law is also known as the law of nations. It deals
with the conduct of international organizations and independent
nations, such as countries, states and tribes. It deals with their
relationship with each other. It also deals with some of their
relationships with persons.
The law of nations is formed by the general assent of civilized
nations. Sources of international law also include international
agreements, as well as treaties.
Sharia Law is Islamic law. It is based on two principal sources,
the Koran44 and the teaching of Mohammed.45

decisions. The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures.
Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia Law. The
provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases before the respective courts
including, but not limited to, cases of first impression.
Id.
41. OKLA. CONST. art. XXIV, § 1.
42. Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1301.
43. Awad, 670 F.3d at 1118. The original text of the ballot initiative read: “This measure
amends the State Constitution. It would change a section that deals with the courts of this state. It
would make courts rely on federal and state laws when deciding cases. It would forbid courts from
looking at international law or [s]haria law when deciding cases.” Id. (emphasis omitted). As a
letter written by William Andrew Edmondson, Oklahoma’s Attorney General, and dated June 2,
2010, explained, this original text was not legally valid as it “[did] not explain what either Sharia
Law or international law [was].” Id. (citation omitted).
44. The word “Koran” is transliterated from Arabic and has many alternative English spellings,
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Despite its simplistic definition of sharia law, and its almost risible call
to ban the use of international law in Oklahoma courts, SQ 755 was
overwhelmingly supported by Oklahoma’s citizens: the ballot initiative was
approved by slightly over seventy percent of the state’s voters.46
The approval of SQ 755 in the November 2, 2010 general election
meant that the initiative’s proposed changes to the Oklahoma Constitution
would take effect as soon as the Oklahoma State Board of Elections certified
the election results.47 This certification was scheduled to occur on
November 9.48 Two days after the election, Muneer Awad, a Muslim citizen
of Oklahoma and the executive director of Oklahoma’s branch of the
Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-OK), filed suit against the
members of the Oklahoma State Board of Elections in federal district court,
seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent this certification from taking
place.49 Asserting that his Islamic faith “inform[ed] the character and
content of his personal and professional relationships,” Awad argued that SQ
755’s proscription of sharia law interfered with his right to practice that
faith by 1) creating an excessive government entanglement in religion in
violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution, 2) infringing his right to freely exercise his faith in
violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and 3)
improperly constraining his freedoms of contract and testation.50
On November 9, the day that the November 2 election results would
have been certified, the district court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the certification of SQ 755 pending the court’s final decision on
Awad’s request for a preliminary injunction.51 The stage was set for one of
the most controversial Establishment Clause battles in recent history.
including “Qur’an,” “Quran,” “Coran,” and similar variations. This Comment will employ the term
“Qur’an,” except in instances where alternative spellings of the word are used in proper titles or
quotations.
45. Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1301.
46. Id. at 1302.
47. Complaint Seeking a Temp. Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 5, Awad v.
Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (No. CIV-10-1186-M).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1–2.
50. Id. at 3, 6–8. Awad’s argument with respect to the freedoms of contract and testation
concerned his last will and testament, which incorporated Islamic customs concerning burial
instructions, bequests, and divisions of the estate of the deceased. Id. at 6–8. Awad feared that,
were SQ 755 to be certified and incorporated into the Oklahoma Constitution, an Oklahoma probate
court could invalidate his will based on its use of sharia-based principles. Id. at 7–8.
51. Awad v. Ziriax, No. CIV-10-1186-M, 2010 WL 4676996, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 9, 2010)
(granting a temporary restraining order).
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III. RELEVANT LAW
The legal issues involved in Awad v. Ziriax represent a curious
intersection of constitutional rights and religo-cultural rules. This section
will address the state of the relevant law involved in the Awad case,
beginning with an explanation of Islamic sharia law and then moving on to
an examination of current First Amendment jurisprudence concerning the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.
A. Sharia Law
Sharia law, defined in its broadest possible sense, is the system of
Islamic rules and regulations that governs not only civil and criminal justice
in an Islamic state, but also the personal and moral conduct of such a state’s
Muslim citizens.52 Unlike the civil and common law legal systems with
which most Westerners are familiar—systems based on clearly codified
written laws, as in France and most of Europe, or on combinations of
codified laws and precedential case law, as in the United Kingdom and the
United States53—sharia law combines purportedly divine dictates,
customary law, and clerical analogy to create religious rules, societal norms,
instructions for personal conduct, and civil and criminal laws.54 For this
reason, the very term “sharia law” is actually a misnomer, as the sharia can
most clearly be understood as describing societal aspirations that are not
legally binding unless adopted as law by a governing authority.55
Additionally, as will be described more fully below, there are significant
disagreements within the Islamic world itself regarding the content of the

52. See RAJ BHALA, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (SHARĪ’A), at xix–xxii (2011). Bhala
quotes S.G. Vesey-Fitzgerald, describing the comprehensive nature of sharia law and its difference
from traditional Western conceptions of what “law” is:
Law . . . in any sense in which a Western lawyer would recognize the term, is but a part
of the whole Islamic system, or rather, it is not even a part but one of several inextricably
combined elements thereof. [Sharia], the Islamic term which is commonly rendered in
English by “law” is, rather, the “Whole Duty of Man.” Moral and pastoral theology and
ethics; high spiritual aspiration and . . . detailed ritualistic and formal observance . . .; all
aspects of law; public and private hygiene; and even good manners are all part and parcel
of the [sharia] . . . .
Id. at xx (quoting S.G. Vesey-Fitzgerald, Nature and Sources of the Sharῑ’a, in I LAW IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 86 (Majid Khadduri & Herbert J. Leibesny eds., 1955)).
53. See generally Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of
Comparison, 15 AM. J. COMP. L., 1966–1967, at 419.
54. See BHALA, supra note 52, at xix–xxii.
55. See Jan Michiel Otto, Introduction to SHARIA INCORPORATED: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW
OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF TWELVE MUSLIM COUNTRIES IN PAST AND PRESENT 19, 26–27 (Jan
Michiel Otto ed., 2010). See also Clark Benner Lombardi, Note, Islamic Law as a Source of
Constitutional Law in Egypt: The Constitutionalization of the Sharia in a Modern Arab State, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 81, 82–84 (1998).
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sharia.56 Thus, while the term “sharia law” appears to denote a wellestablished and clearly-defined body of rules and regulations, the reality is
that sharia is far more nebulous than its classification as “law” would
suggest.57
1. Sources of Law
Oklahoma’s SQ 755 defined sharia as having “two principal sources,
the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.”58 Although SQ 755 correctly
identified the two principal sources of sharia law, there are actually four
main sources from which the content of the sharia is derived: the Qur’an,
the sunna (collected tales of the life and actions of Muhammad), quiyas (i.e.
“analogy”), and ijma (i.e. “consensus”).59 Collectively, the sources of the
sharia make up the fiqh—the collected corpus of Islamic jurisprudence that,
essentially, dictates the content of sharia law.60 Because qiyas and ijma, the
secondary sources of fiqh, are both intricately connected to the Islamic
precepts laid out in the Qur’an and the sunna,61 the language of SQ 755
would likely ban the “consider[ation] or [use]” of all these sources of
sharia.62
The Qur’an, Islam’s holy book, provides the central foundation of the

56. Lombardi, supra note 55, at 92–96. See also JAN MICHIEL OTTO, SHARIA AND NATIONAL
LAW IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES: TENSIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR DUTCH AND EU FOREIGN POLICY
7–8 (2008). As Professor Jan Michiel Otto, who has authored numerous books and articles on the
subject of sharia, writes:
[N]umerous interpretations of sharia can be found in laws, scholarly literature, the media
and in popular perceptions. . . . Due to the extraordinary variety of views on sharia
within Muslim countries, the ‘rules in use’ of sharia differ greatly between [various
Muslim] groups. When people refer to the sharia, they are, in fact, referring to their
sharia . . . .
OTTO, supra.
57. See Jan Michiel Otto, Introduction to SHARIA INCORPORATED, supra note 55, at 24–25.
58. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1301 (W.D. Okla. 2010).
59. NOËL J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 76 (1994); see also Irshad Abdal-Haqq,
Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origin and Elements, in UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW: FROM
CLASSICAL TO CONTEMPORARY 1, 11–22 (Hisham M. Ramadan ed., 2006).
60. The term “fiqh” can also refer to the process of deducing the content of sharia law, for
instance through one of the four sources of sharia elaborated above and described infra, notes 63–
79. See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 59, at 14 (“Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) refers to both the science
of deducing and applying the principles and injunctions of Shari’ah, as well as the sum total of the
deductions by particular jurists.”).
61. See infra notes 63–73 and accompanying text.
62. Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1301.
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whole of Islamic theology and, thus, the central foundation of the sharia.63
According to Islamic tradition, the Qur’an was dictated to Muhammad by
the angel Jibrīl (the Arabic form of the Christian “Gabriel”) over the course
of twenty-three years, between roughly 610 and 632 AD.64 For this reason,
it is viewed as the inspired word of Allah (God).65
The Qur’an is the central point of reference for the content of Islamic
law: its 114 surahs, or chapters, and 6235 verses form the foundation of
sharia. Though the Qur’an is not, by any means, a legal code, it contains a
number of specifically legal commands mixed into the generally moral,
religious, and devotional matters that comprise the majority of its content.
Approximately 350 of the Qur’an’s 6235 verses contain legal instructions,
although this number is imprecise as “a learned scholar [or] mujtahid” may
“derive a rule of law even from the parables and historical passages of the
Qur’ān.”66 These legal verses, which are commonly known as the ayat alahkam, concern such matters as inheritance, marriage, divorce, commercial
Because of the Qur’an’s seminal
transactions, and criminal law.67
importance to the Islamic faith, it not only comprises a source of Islamic law
in and of itself, but is also used to derive and interpret the other three sources
of sharia law.68
The second source of Islamic jurisprudence can be found in the sunna,
which describes the practices of and examples set by Muhammad.69 Use of

63.

See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 59, at 11. See also Maulana Muhammad ‘Ali, INTRODUCTION
22 (1992).
64. See BHALA, supra note 52, at 74–75.
65. Indeed, as Mū’il Yūsuf ‘Izz al-Dīn, an Islamic scholar and author, explains:
The Qur’an, or the Book, al-Kitāb, represents the most important source of Islamic law,
being the ultimate word of the Divine. It is not seen by Muslims as purely a book of law,
since it is a book that includes clarification of every matter. The word al-Kitāb indicates
the significance of textual authority in the Islamic legal mind. It therefore also implies
what was composed and given by God; this first source of Islamic law is to be respected
more than any human-made law.
MAWIL IZZI DIEN, ISLAMIC LAW: FROM HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS TO CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE
37 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 2004).
66. KAMALI, supra note 8, at 20.
67. See id.
68. See DIEN, supra note 65, at 37–38. An example of sharia derived directly from the Qur’an
can be found in the area of inheritance law—one area of Islamic law that was at issue in Awad. See
Complaint Seeking a Temp. Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 3, 6–8, Awad v. Ziriax,
754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (No. CIV-10-1186-M). Sura 4:11 is a Qur’anic verse
which provides explicit instructions regarding the distribution of property: “Allah (thus) directs you /
As regards your children’s / (Inheritance): to the male, / A portion equal to that / Of two females: if
only / Daughters, two or more, / Their share is two-thirds / Of the inheritance; / If only one, her share
/ Is a half.” THE MEANING OF THE HOLY QUR’AN
̄ 4:11 (‘Abdullah Yūsuf ‘Ali trans., 11th ed. 2009).
69. See ISLAM: A SHORT GUIDE TO THE FAITH 38–40 (Roger Allen & Shawkat M. Toorawa
eds., 2011); Abdal-Haqq, supra note 59, at 12–14; see also RAYMOND IBRAHIM, Introduction to THE
AL-QAEDA READER, at 1, 7 (Raymond Ibrahim ed., 2007). As Raymond Ibrahim, a Coptic Christian
scholar of Islam and Islamism writes, “the importance of the sunna arises from the function of
TO THE STUDY OF THE HOLY QUR’ĀN
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the sunna as a source of sharia law can be traced to Qur’anic injunction: the
Qur’an not only instructs Muslims to “[o]bey God and His Messenger [e.g.
Muhammad],” but also states that all of mankind has an “excellent pattern
(of conduct)” in the person of Muhammad.70 Even more explicitly, a later
Qur’anic verse commands Muslims to “take what the Messenger [e.g.
Muhammad] / Assigns to you, and deny / Yourselves that which he /
Withholds from you.”71 Thus, in the early centuries of Islam, Islamic
religious scholars collected reports—known as hadith—of the teachings,
sayings, and actions of Muhammad, which, collectively, form the corpus of
the sunna.72
While the Qu’ran and the sunna comprise the two primary sources of
sharia law, there are two other key principles used to derive the content of
the sharia: the principles of ijma and qiyas.73 Ijma is the Islamic term for a
form of consensus among religious scholars—or, in some interpretations,
among the entire Muslim community—that can settle the moral status of a
questionable act.74 Allegedly grounded in a statement by Muhammad that
the Muslim community would “never agree upon an error,” ijma operates
under the principle that a unanimous consensus on a particular topic is a
miraculous sign proving the infallibility of the community’s decision
regarding that topic.75 Because of the difficulty involved in achieving
unanimous consensus, however, the fourth and final source of sharia law,
qiyas, is quite important. Qiyas is a form of clerical analogy employed to
determine the legality or morality of actions that are not directly addressed
in the Qu’ran or the sunna.76 It principally involves analogizing the action in

Muhammad as the founder of Islam—hence the authoritative if not inspired nature of his words and
deeds.” IBRAHIM, supra.
70. THE MEANING OF THE HOLY QUR’AN
̄ , supra note 68, at 3:32, 33:21.
71. Id. at 59:7.
72. GUIDE TO THE FAITH, supra note 69, at 38. In the Sunni religious tradition, there are six
collections of hadith that are considered especially authentic: the hadith collections of Abu alBukhari, Abu Husein ibn Muslim, Abu Dawood, Abu al-Tirmidhi, Abu al-Darimi, and Abu ibn
Majah. SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR, ISLAM: RELIGION, HISTORY, AND CIVILIZATION 55 (2003) (“‘The
Six Correct Books’ . . . constitute the canonical and orthodox sources of Hadīth in the Sunni world,
[and] are the Jāmi’ al-ṣaḥīḥ of Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Bukhārī, the Ṣaḥīḥ of Abu’l-Ḥusayn ibn
Muslim al-Nayshābūrī, the Sunan of Abū Dā’ūd al-Sijistānī, the Jāmi’ of Abū ‘Īsā al-Tirmidhī, the
Sunan of Abū Muḥammad al-Dārimī, and the Sunan of Abū ‘Abd Allāh ibn Mājah. There have been
other important compilations, but they never gained the authority of these six works.”).
73. See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 59, at 16–19.
74. See COULSON, supra note 59, at 77. See also IBRAHIM, supra note 69, at 89; Lombardi,
supra note 55, at 93.
75. COULSON, supra note 59, at 77; see also Lombardi, supra note 55, at 93.
76. See IBRAHIM, supra note 69, at 8; see also Lombardi, supra note 55, at 93.
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question to similar circumstances that are elaborated in the Islamic holy
texts or that have been addressed in previous clerical rulings.77
A brief note should be made here of ijtihad, the concept of individual
reasoning, which may—or may not—be legitimately viewed as a fifth
method of deriving the content of the sharia.78 Ijtihad is a controversial
subject in the Islamic world: use of ijtihad to interpret the sharia has been
informally prohibited by the Muslim ulema (Islamic religious scholars) since
the Tenth Century, a prohibition that was given “official” sanction in the
Thirteenth Century, when the Iraqi ulema declared the doors to ijtihad
permanently closed.79 These groups of medieval scholars, like the Islamists
of the modern day, feared the effect that changing circumstances and new
interactions with foreign cultures would have on Islamic traditions, and they
believed that “[b]y closing the door to individual reasoning . . . the guiding
principles of Islam would remain intact for posterity.”80 Despite the
traditional prohibition on the use of ijtihad, not all Muslim scholars accepted
this ban on individual reasoning as legitimate,81 and, indeed, among certain
sects and branches of Islam ijtihad remained an important source of
jurisprudential derivation.82 In the modern day, debates concerning the
relevance and legitimacy of ijtihad remain extremely topical and form an

77. See Lombardi, supra note 55, at 93.
78. See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 59, at 20–22.
79. Id. See also BHALA, supra note 52, at 335–36. As scholars of Islamic legal development
explain, the discouragement of ijtihad arose because, by the Tenth Century
the point had been reached when the scholars of all schools [e.g., the madh’habs, see
infra notes 84–101 and accompanying text] felt that all essential questions had been
thoroughly discussed and finally settled, and a consensus gradually established itself to
the effect that from that time onwards no one might be deemed to have the necessary
qualifications for independent reasoning in law, and that all future activity would have to
be confined to the explanation, application, and, at the most, interpretation of the
doctrine as it had been laid down once and for all.
BHALA, supra note 52, at 335–36 (emphasis in original) (citation added) (quoting JOSEPH SCHACHT,
AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 70 (1982)).
80. Abdal-Haqq, supra note 59, at 21.
81. For instance, Muhammad Iqbal, a prominent Muslim poet and philosopher who lived in
British-controlled India from his birth in 1877 to his death in 1938, wrote that
[t]he closing of the door of Ijtihād is pure fiction suggested partly by the crystallization of
legal thought in Islam, and partly by that intellectual laziness which, especially in the
period of spiritual decay, turns great thinkers into idols. If some of the later doctors have
upheld this fiction, modern Islam is not bound by this voluntary surrender of intellectual
independence.
MUHAMMAD IQBAL, RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN ISLAM 137 (Lahore ed. 1989)
(1929), available at http://www.allamaiqbal.com/works/prose/english/reconstruction/.
82. Shi’ite Muslims, for instance, were traditionally more open to the use of ijtihad—
particularly by their divine leaders, the Imams—than their Sunni brethren. See Abdal-Haqq, supra
note 59, at 29.
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important part of the ideological struggle between Islamists and Islamic
moderates throughout the Muslim world.83
2. Madh’habs: The Schools of Islamic Law
While all Muslims agree—at least in principle—with the four main
sources of sharia law discussed above,84 important differences regarding the
content of the sharia remain. There are two principal reasons for this. The
first is the inter-religious split amongst the early Muslim faithful that
occurred shortly after the death of Muhammad.85 This schism—engendered
by a disagreement over who should replace Muhammad as the caliph, or
leader, of the Muslim community—resulted in the separation of Islam into
two branches: the Sunnis and the Shi’ites.86 While the Sunni-Shi’a split is
certainly an important factor in the study of comparative sharia law,87 a full
account of the religious differences between these two branches of Islam is
beyond the scope of this Comment. The second, and, for the purposes of
this Comment, more significant, reason for the differences among Muslims
with respect to the content of sharia law can be found in the development of
the madh’habs, separate and distinct schools of Islamic jurisprudence, within
the first several centuries after the birth of Islam.88
The development of the madh’habs began as the founding generation of
the Islamic religion—and, specifically, the Sahaba, or companions of
Muhammad—passed away and as Islamic armies advanced from Arabia,
conquering nearly all of the Middle East and much of Northern Africa mere
decades after the death of Muhammad.89 While the former deprived the
early Muslims of the knowledge and guidance of those who had directly
interacted with Islam’s holy prophet, the latter forced them into contact with

83. See generally David A. Jordan, The Dark Ages of Islam: Ijtihad, Apostasy, and Human
Rights in Contemporary Islamic Jurisprudence, 9 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 55
(2003).
84. See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 59, at 14.
85. See BHALA, supra note 52, at 186–203.
86. See id.
87. See KAMALI, supra note 8, at 87–93.
88. The word “madh’hab” or “madhhab” literally means the “way of going.” Abdal-Haqq,
supra note 59, at 24. Thus, the word is used to describe the different paths or schools of Islamic
legal thought. See id. at 24–29.
89. See I.M. Lapidus, The Arab Conquests and the Formation of Islamic Society, in 27 THE
FORMATION OF ISLAMIC LAW 1, 17–24 (Wael B. Hallaq ed., 2004); see also Harald Motzki, The
Role of Non-Arab Converts in the Development of Early Islamic Law, in 27 THE FORMATION OF
ISLAMIC LAW 153, 153–77 (Wael B. Hallaq ed., 2004).
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new cultures and peoples; both required the Muslim community to develop
principles for interpreting, extending, and applying the sharia law that
Muhammad had established.90 The early Islamic scholars, applying the fiqh
methodologies discussed above in various ways, developed over a dozen
madh’habs, or schools of Islamic jurisprudence.91 As time passed, however,
five main schools of thought crystallized, and these five madh’habs remain
the central schools of Islamic thought to this day.92
The five principle schools of Islamic jurisprudence are the Hanafi,
Maliki, Shafi’i, Hanbali, and Jafari schools, each named after the Islamic
scholar whose system of thought and interpretation established its basic
theological and interpretive methodologies.93 Again, it should be noted that
the different schools of Islamic thought all recognize the authority of the
same sources from which the sharia is derived; the central difference among
the schools is the relative importance of each source and the degree to which
each is relevant or applicable.94 The earliest of the five madh’habs, the
Hanafi School, was based on the teachings and jurisprudence of Abu Hanifa
(702–767 C.E.), a merchant and scholar who emphasized the use of qiyas to
deduce the sharia in instances when the Qur’an, sunna, and consensus of the
Sahaba did not speak to the question at issue.95 In contrast to the Hanafi and
other schools, the chronologically subsequent Maliki School, founded on the
jurisprudence of Malik Ibn Anas Ibn Amir (717–802 C.E.), supplemented
the typical four sources of law with a new, unique source: the customs and
traditions of the people of Medina, the second holiest city in Islam.96
Because of the Medinans’ reverence for custom and tradition stretching back
to the time of Muhammad, Malik Amir reasoned, the traditions of the city
likely carried the imprimatur of the Prophet and the founding generation of
Muslims and, thus, could carry jurisprudential weight.97 The Shafi’i School,
the third major madh’hab founded upon the teachings of Muhammad Idris
ash-Shafi’I (769–820 C.E.), returned to the traditional quartet of
jurisprudential sources, heavily emphasizing the Qur’an and sunna over both
ijma and qiyas.98 Continuing the Shafi’i drive back toward traditional

90. See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 59, at 24.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 26–29. While each of the five madh’habs give the Qur’an and the sunna the
preeminent positions of importance in the interpretation of sharia law, the use of ijma and qiyas, as
well as the extent to which certain hadith of the sunna are or are not accurate, differ widely between
the schools. Id.
95. See KAMALI, supra note 8, at 70–73; Abdal-Haqq, supra note 59, at 26.
96. See KAMALI, supra note 8, at 73–77; Abdal-Haqq, supra note 59, at 26–27.
97. See KAMALI, supra note 8, at 73–76.
98. See id. at 77–83; see also Abdal-Haqq, supra note 59, at 27–28.
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sources of fiqh, the Hanbali School, widely recognized as the strictest, most
conservative, and most traditional Islamic madh’hab, practically eliminated
the use of any jurisprudential source other than the Qur’an and sunna.99
Centered around the teachings of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (778–855 C.E.), the
Hanbali School emphasized the hadith tradition of the sunna more heavily
than any other school, accepting the primacy of even weakly supported
hadith over other sources of fiqh; rejecting the use of ijma (with the
exception of any consensus reached about jurisprudential matters by the
founding generation of Muslims); and employing qiyas only as a last resort
to address issues or questions that could not be settled by any other means.100
Finally, the Jafari School, predominant among Shi’ite Muslims and founded
upon the teachings of Abu Jafar Muhammad Al-Baqir (d. 735) and Jafar
Sadiq (d. 765), the fifth and sixth Shi’ite Imams, emphasizes the importance
of the Qur’an and sunna, but is also traditionally recognized as allowing a
broader acceptance of ijtihad—the process of individual reasoning that is
generally frowned upon in the other Islamic madh’habs.101
B. First Amendment Jurisprudence: Freedom of Religion
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution, protecting
religious freedom as well as other important rights, was adopted during the
First Congress to assuage what many of the Founding Fathers viewed as the
pernicious effects of government imposing itself into the religious realm.102
The relevant section of the Amendment provides that “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof . . . .”103 In constitutional jurisprudence, the two clauses of
this section are known respectively as the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause.
A clear understanding of current constitutional

99.
100.
101.
102.

See KAMALI, supra note 8, at 83–84; see also Abdal-Haqq, supra note 59, at 28–29.
See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 59, at 28–29.
See KAMALI, supra note 8, at 87–93; see also Abdal-Haqq, supra note 59, at 29.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162–64 (1879). As the Supreme Court noted,
Before the adoption of the Constitution, attempts were made in some of the colonies
and States to legislate not only in respect to the establishment of religion, but in respect to
its doctrines and precepts as well. The people were taxed, against their will, for the
support of religion, and sometimes for the support of particular sects to whose tenets they
could not and did not subscribe. Punishments were prescribed for a failure to attend upon
public worship, and sometimes for entertaining heretical opinions. The controversy upon
this general subject was animated in many of the States . . . .
Id. at 162–63.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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interpretations of these clauses is essential to addressing the issues raised in
Awad.
1. The Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause prohibits Congress from making any law
“respecting an establishment of religion.”104 Modern Establishment Clause
jurisprudence can be traced to the 1947 case of Everson v. Board of
Education of Ewing Township, in which the United States Supreme Court
examined the constitutional validity of a state law using an Establishment
Clause analysis—the first time any such analysis had been used with respect
to the states.105 The issue in Everson arose when the Ewing Township Board
of Education, acting under the impetus of a New Jersey law permitting local
school districts to make rules and contracts related to the transport of
children to and from schools, authorized a program to reimburse parents for
the cost of bus fare for their children’s daily school commute.106 This
reimbursement was paid to both the parents of children attending secular
public schools and the parents of children attending local Catholic parochial
schools, leading one disgruntled taxpayer to file suit against the Board of
Education alleging that the reimbursement program violated the
Establishment Clause.107 Despite a spirited dissent by Justice Rutledge, the
Court held that the School Board’s reimbursement program was a public
service that benefitted all families—religious or non-religious—equally and,
thus, did not violate the Establishment Clause.108 More important than the
Court’s decision regarding the reimbursement program, however, was the
Court’s affirmation that the Establishment Clause, and the wide-ranging
prohibitions on government action that it entails, had been applied to the
states since the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.109

104. Id.
105. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See Donald L. Drakeman, Everson v. Board of Education and the Quest
for the Historical Establishment Clause, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 119 (2007).
106. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3.
107. Id. at 3–4. The Everson plaintiff’s argument was essentially the same as one of the
rationales for the First Amendment’s religious protection elaborated in Reynolds: that using taxpayer
funds to reimburse the parents of Catholic school-goers caused the plaintiff to be “taxed, against
[his] will, for the support of religion.” Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 162.
108. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16–18. Citing the historical development of the First Amendment’s
religious protections, Justice Rutledge insisted that the First Amendment “forbids any appropriation,
large or small, from public funds to aid or support any and all religious exercises.” Id. at 41
(Rutledge, J., dissenting).
109. The Court offered an extensive list elaborating the meaning of the Establishment Clause,
stating that the clause means at a minimum that neither a state nor the Federal government can “set
up a church”; “pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another”; “force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion”; or “openly or secretly, participate in the
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The most significant development in modern Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, however, came in 1971, when the Supreme Court created the
now-infamous “Lemon test” in the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman.110 Lemon
concerned a pair of state statutes from Pennsylvania and Rhode Island that
provided state assistance to non-public schools: the Pennsylvania statute
allowed for the provision of state aid in the form of partial reimbursements
to the non-public schools for such things as “teachers’ salaries, textbooks,
and instructional materials,” while the Rhode Island statute provided that the
state would pay teachers at non-public schools a supplement to their annual
salary.111 In addressing the question of whether these two statutes violated
the Establishment Clause, the Court built upon several of its past First
Amendment cases to conclude that a state statute could only pass
constitutional muster if 1) “the statute [had] a secular legislative purpose,” 2)
the statute’s “principal or primary effect [was] one that neither advance[d]
nor inhibit[ed] religion,” and 3) “the statute [did] not foster ‘an excessive
government entanglement with religion.’”112 Applying this three-part test to
the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes at issue, the Court found that
both statutes were unconstitutional because they effectively created an
“excessive entanglement between government and religion.”113
Since its creation in 1971, the three-part “Lemon test” has been roundly
criticized, both by legal scholars114 and by members of the Supreme Court
Indeed, the Court’s somewhat confusing track record of
itself.115

affairs of any religious organizations or groups.” Everson, 330 U.S. at 15–16. The Court further
stated that the Establishment Clause meant that “[n]o person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance,” and that “[n]o
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.” Id.
110. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
111. Id. at 606–07.
112. Id. at 612–13 (internal citations omitted).
113. Id. at 614.
114. See Carl H. Esbeck, The Lemon Test: Should It Be Retained, Reformulated or Rejected, 4
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 513, 543–48 (1990). “It is hard,” Esbeck wrote, “to think
of a contemporary legal doctrine that is as besieged from all quarters as is the Lemon test.” Id. at
543.
115. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia once famously analogized the “Lemon test” to a
“ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after
being repeatedly killed and buried . . . .” Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). As Scalia pointed out, no fewer than five Supreme
Court Justices—himself, Clarence Thomas, Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O’Connor, and William
Rehnquist—had repudiated the Lemon test. Id. at 398–99. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
644 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined by, inter alios, Thomas, J., dissenting); County of Allegheny. v. ACLU,
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 655–57 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
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Establishment Clause cases over the past several decades shows that the
Lemon test is certainly not a bright-line rule: the test has been applied
sporadically, and some Establishment Clause cases have been settled with no
reference to the test at all.116 Further complicating the issue are numerous
interpretations and explications of the Lemon test that have been offered by
members of the Supreme Court over the years.117 As early as 1984, Justice
O’Connor offered a reformulation of the Lemon test, the “endorsement test,”
that has come to be accepted and used in numerous lower-level cases,
including Awad.118 More recently, Justice Breyer has even declared that “no
single mechanical formula . . . can accurately draw the constitutional line in
every [Establishment Clause] case.”119 Nevertheless, the Lemon test
continues to play an important role in the Supreme Court’s Establishment
Clause jurisprudence: the test has been applied by the Court as recently as
2005, and, despite the criticism to which the test has been subjected, there
seems to be little question that its three prongs—and its numerous
corollaries—remain the primary factors for determining the constitutionality
of government actions challenged under the Establishment Clause.120

dissenting in part); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346–49 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
107–13 (1985) (Rehquist, J., dissenting).
116. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (describing the Court’s “unwillingness to
be confined” to any single Establishment Clause test and its refusal to apply the Lemon test in such
cases as Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) and Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982)).
117. See Esbeck, supra note 114, at 515–31 (describing the various jurisprudential changes to the
Lemon test that have occurred since its original formulation).
118. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687–94 (O’Connor, J., concurring). According to O’Connor, the
primary aim of both the “purpose” and “effect” prongs of the Lemon test is to prevent the
“endorsement” or “disapproval” of particular religious beliefs. Id. at 690. Under the “endorsement
test,” a government practice should not communicate a “message of government endorsement or
disapproval of religion”—even if no such endorsement or disapproval actually exists—because such
a message would lead to the perception that some members of the community (those members
belonging to the endorsed religion) were more privileged or highly valued than others. Id. at 688,
692. O’Connor’s endorsement test has been adopted as a key method for examining Establishment
Clause cases in the Tenth Circuit, where the Court of Appeals has held that “the government
impermissibly endorses religion if its conduct has either (1) the purpose or (2) the effect of
conveying a message that ‘religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.’”
Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 551 (10th Cir. 1997).
119. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 699 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
120. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859–66 (2005). In addition to Justice
O’Connor’s “endorsement test,” described supra note 118 and accompanying text, another corollary
to the Lemon test can be found in the case of Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). The so-called
“Larson test” further complicates the realm of Establishment Clause jurisprudence by removing an
entire subset of cases—cases involving State laws that “discriminate among religions,” rather than
“affording [] uniform benefit[s] to all religions”—from the realm of Lemon test analysis. Id. at 252.
These cases, the Court held, must be examined using a heightened level of scrutiny than the typical
Lemon test analysis applies. Id. at 252–55. Larson is significant because the Larson test played a
key role in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ analysis of the Awad case. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670
F.3d 1111, 1126–31 (10th Cir. 2012).
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2. The Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution provides that
Congress shall make no law “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.121
Together with the Establishment Clause, discussed above, the Free Exercise
Clause provides the main bulwark of the Constitution’s protections of
religious liberty.122 While a literal reading of the Free Exercise Clause might
lead to the conclusion that the Constitution prohibits any governmental
interference with religious exercise, expression, or worship, the application
of the Clause in constitutional jurisprudence has proven to be far more
complicated than such a narrow reading would suggest.123 Numerous federal
and state statutes that effectively regulate or prohibit activities that could be
undertaken for a religious purpose have been enacted, and many of these
statutes have been upheld as constitutional.124 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has recognized that the Free Exercise Clause encompasses two concepts: the
“freedom to believe” and the “freedom to act.”125 While the freedom to
believe is typically viewed as an “absolute” freedom, the freedom to act on
one’s religious beliefs is not—it is a qualified freedom that is “subject to
regulation for the protection of society.”126 Indeed, to afford religious action
the full protection that the Free Exercise Clause appears to require would, as
the Supreme Court held in one of its seminal cases on the subject, “make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and . . .
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”127
The question of which religious actions or observances Congress or the
state legislatures can regulate, and which are protected and may not be
regulated, is one that has remained a significant source of debate up to the
present day. While responses to this question continue to develop as

121. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
122. Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of
Religion or Belief in the United States, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1187, 1189 (2005).
123. See generally id. (describing the various legal limitations on the freedom of religion allowed
under current Free Exercise jurisprudence).
124. See id. at 1211–30.
125. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
126. Id. at 303–04.
127. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879). The famous Reynolds case involved the
question of polygamy, specifically whether a federal law prohibiting polygamy in United States
territories was constitutional, as it (allegedly) infringed upon the religious beliefs of members of the
Mormon Church. Id. at 161. The decision was the first instance in which the Court explicitly held
that Congress could regulate certain religiously-based actions, even if it could not regulate religious
beliefs. Id. at 167.
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constitutional interpretation evolves, a brief overview of the Court’s recent
Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence provides the beginnings of an answer.
First, it should be noted that the Court’s initial decisions relating to the Free
Exercise Clause—beginning with Reynolds in the late 1870s and continuing
through Cantwell in the 1940s—did not seriously attempt to create a “test”
for determining the validity of congressional regulation of religious
practice.128 In these decisions, the Court applied a rather free-wheeling
approach to its Free Exercise analysis, and largely seemed to take for
granted the idea that certain actions (for instance, the practice of polygamy)
simply fell outside the realm of religious protection.129
It was not until 1963, with the case of Sherbert v. Verner, that the
Supreme Court first developed a multi-factor test for determining the
constitutionality of legislative restraints on religious action.130 In Sherbert,
which dealt with a South Carolina unemployment law under which a
member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church was denied unemployment
benefits due to her faith-based refusal to work on Saturdays, the Court
stipulated that a law’s validity under the Free Exercise Clause was a product
of three factors.131 First, did the law actually impose a burden on the free
exercise of the plaintiff’s religion?132 Second, if such a burden was imposed,
was there a “compelling state interest” that justified this infringement of the
plaintiff’s right to freely exercise his or her religion?133 Finally, even if the
first two factors were met, did the state or federal government demonstrate
that “no alternative forms of regulation” existed that would sufficiently
satisfy the aims of the compelling state interest without infringing on a
plaintiff’s First Amendment rights?134 This test, known as the “compelling
state interest test,” served as the main method of determining Free Exercise
constitutionality until 1990, when the Court decided the case of Employment
Division v. Smith.135

128. See id. at 167; see also Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.
129. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163–67. In delineating the dividing line between religious liberty
and government restriction, the Supreme Court cited Virginia’s early religious liberty statute, which
drew a distinction between religious belief and action. Id. at 163. The government, the Court
insinuated, can restrict actions when religious principles “break out into overt acts against peace and
good order.” Id. (internal citation omitted). While the dichotomy between religious belief and
religious action proved useful in other early Free Exercise cases—such as Cantwell, in which a
Connecticut law concerning public religious solicitation was struck down due to the fact that it,
effectively, allowed the secretary of the state’s Public Welfare Council to determine what was or was
not a valid religious belief—the nebulous holding in Reynolds remained the only real “test” until the
mid-1900s. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
130. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403–09.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 403–04.
133. Id. at 406.
134. Id. at 407.
135. 494 U.S. 872, 877–79 (1990); see Daniel A. Crane, Beyond RFRA: Free Excercise of
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With its decision in Smith, the infamous case that pitted Oregon’s antidrug statutes against two Native Americans who had ingested peyote for
allegedly sacramental purposes, the Supreme Court abandoned the
“compelling state interest test,” returning to the more nebulous Free Exercise
jurisprudence that characterized its pre-Sherbert decisions.136 “[T]he right of
free exercise,” the Court held, “does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on
the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes).’”137 Under the Court’s Smith analysis, no clear
test was established; instead, a “neutral, generally applicable law” could
only be held to violate the Free Exercise Clause in certain “hybrid cases,” in
which the law at issue curtailed not only Free Exercise rights, but also other
constitutional rights, such as the freedom of speech or freedom of the
press.138
Despite the outrage caused by the Court’s decision in Smith, the “hybrid
case” theory remains the predominant method for determining whether a law
violates the Free Exercise Clause.139 Since Smith, the theory has best been
explicated in the case of Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, which set out three main principles governing Free Exercise
examinations.140 First, at the most basic level, the protections of the Free
Exercise Clause will always pertain “if the law at issue discriminates against
some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is
undertaken for religious reasons.”141 Second, echoing Smith, the Court held
that a neutral law of general applicability “need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of
burdening a particular religious practice.”142 Finally, and conversely, a law

Religion Comes of Age in the State Courts, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 235, 235–36 (1998).
136. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877–79. See also Crane, supra note 135, at 235–36.
137. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens,
J., concurring)).
138. See id. at 881–82.
139. The outcry against the Smith decision resulted in Congress passing the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), which attempted to legislate around Smith by mandating the Sherbert
“compelling state interest test” as the primary method of determining Free Exercise compliance, in
late 1993. Crane, supra note 135, at 236–37. This showdown between Congress and the Supreme
Court, however, ended with the invalidation of the RFRA in 1997, when the Court held the Act to be
an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to legislate the meaning of the Constitution. City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530–36 (1997). See Crane, supra note 135, at 238.
140. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
141. Id. at 532.
142. Id. at 531.
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that is not neutral or generally applicable to the public as a whole “must be
justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly
tailored to advance that interest.”143 A law lacks facial neutrality—and, thus,
must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling interest—if its object is
“to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation”
or if it “refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernable
from the language or context.”144
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY: THE JUDGMENT IN AWAD
In discussing the final judgment in the Awad case, it is necessary to
explain both the judgment of the district court and that of the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals. While both courts reached the same conclusion—that SQ
755 unconstitutionally violated the First Amendment—the reasoning and
analysis that each court employed was very different.
A. Judgment of the Federal District Court of the Western District of
Oklahoma
Almost three weeks passed between the federal district court’s issuance
of a temporary injunction preventing the certification of Oklahoma’s sharia
law ban and the date that the court issued its final decision regarding Awad’s
requested preliminary injunction.145 In addressing the question of the
preliminary injunction, the court first discussed the standard to be applied in
determining whether a preliminary injunction should be granted.146 The
court specified that a preliminary injunction should be granted only if 1)
Awad had “a substantial likelihood of success” in overturning the provisions
of SQ 755 on its constitutional merits; 2) Awad was likely to suffer
“irreparable injury . . . if an injunction [was] denied;” 3) the threatened
injury to Awad outweighed the injury that would result to the State of
Oklahoma, the party opposing the injunction; and 4) granting the injunction
“would not be adverse to the public interest.”147 Additionally, because Awad
was seeking a special type of “disfavored” preliminary injunction—an
injunction that would prevent SQ 755’s banning of sharia law from ever
taking effect, the same relief that would occur if Awad challenged the
constitutionality of the sharia law ban on its merits after SQ 755 became

143. Id. at 531–32.
144. Id. at 533.
145. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1301 (W.D. Okla. 2010); see Awad v. Ziriax, No.
CIV-10-1186-M, 2010 WL 4676996, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 9, 2010).
146. Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1305.
147. Id. (citing Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. EchoStar Satellite Corp., 269 F.3d 1149, 1154
(10th Cir. 2001)).
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part of Oklahoma’s constitution—he was required to satisfy a “heightened
burden” and make an especially strong showing with respect to his
likelihood of success.148
The district court primarily focused its analysis on the first of the four
elements required for Awad’s requested injunction to be granted: the
likelihood of Awad’s success were he to challenge the constitutionality of
the sharia ban itself.149 The court first examined Awad’s assertion that SQ
755 violated the Establishment Clause, applying the Lemon test in
conjunction with Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement test.”150 Based on these
tests, the court held that there was a strong likelihood that SQ 755 violated
both the “effect” and “excessive entanglement” prongs of the Lemon test.151
The court then turned to Awad’s claim that SQ 755 violated the Free
Exercise Clause.152 Citing the Free Exercise principles laid out in Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, the court held both that SQ 755 was not “facially
neutral” and that the Oklahoma Board of Elections had offered no evidence
that the amendment was “narrowly tailored” or justified by a compelling
interest.153 Thus, the court ruled, Awad had made a sufficiently strong
showing with respect to his likelihood of success on the merits to satisfy the

148. Id. (citing O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 975–
76 (10th Cir. 2004)) (“If, however, a movant is seeking a disfavored preliminary injunction—
preliminary injunctions that alter the status quo, mandatory preliminary injunctions, or preliminrary
injunctions that afford the movant all the relief that it could recover at the conclusion of a full trial
on the merits—the movant must satisfy a heightened burden.”).
149. Id. at 1305–07.
150. Id. at 1305–06. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606–07, 612–14 (1971); see also
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–94 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
151. Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1306–07. With respect to the “effect” prong, the court noted that,
under the “endorsement test,” SQ 755’s specific prohibition against the application of sharia law, or
the recognition of sharia-based legal decisions from other states, “reasonably . . . may be viewed as
specifically singling out Sharia Law, conveying a message of disapproval of plaintiff’s faith.” Id. at
1306. Additionally, because sharia law “is not actually ‘law’, but is religious traditions that provide
guidance to plaintiff and other Muslims regarding the exercise of their faith,” the court noted that SQ
755’s prohibition of sharia was even more likely to be viewed as an inappropriate and
unconstitutional message of disapproval of the Muslim faith. Id. With respect to the “excessive
entanglement” prong, the court, reiterating that sharia law is made up of “religious traditions that
differ among Muslims” depending on their location and individualized beliefs, ruled that, in order to
comply with SQ 755, “Oklahoma courts will be faced with determining the content of Sharia Law,
and, thus, the content of plaintiff’s religious doctrines.” Id. at 1306–07. Such a determination would
be a blatant violation of the “excessive entanglement” prong of the Lemon test. Id. at 1307.
152. Id. at 1307.
153. Id. (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–33
(1993)).
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heightened burden necessary to justify his requested preliminary
injunction.154
In comparison with Awad’s likely success on the merits of a
constitutional challenge to SQ 755, the remaining three elements in the
court’s preliminary injunction analysis were given relatively little
attention.155 The court held that Awad had satisfied the “irreparable injury”
element in a brief, two-sentence analysis.156 In a slightly more lengthy
discussion, it then held that, because protecting Awad’s constitutional rights
was more important than ratifying the will of the majority of Oklahoma
voters, the “balance of harms” element was satisfied as well.157 Finally, the
court, noting that the U.S. Constitution and Oklahoma statute both indicate
that upholding individuals’ constitutional rights is inherently in the public
interest, held that the “public interest” element was also satisfied.158
Based on its analysis of Awad’s request for a preliminary injunction,
and, particularly, on its analysis of Awad’s likely success in challenging the
constitutionality of SQ 755, the district court granted the injunction, thereby
preventing Oklahoma’s State Board of Elections from certifying the passage
of the amendment and its incorporation into the Oklahoma Constitution.159
B. Judgment of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
After its loss in the district court, the Oklahoma Board of Elections
appealed the decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which, in
January 2012, affirmed the district court’s holding enjoining the certification
of SQ 755. In affirming the injunction against SQ 755, the Tenth Circuit
agreed with the district court’s analysis with respect to classifying Awad’s
requested injunction as a disfavored injunction requiring a heightened
standard of scrutiny.160 Applying the standard, four factor test for analyzing
preliminary injunctions, it also affirmed the district court’s holdings that
Awad had shown 1) that he would suffer irreparable injury if his injunction
was denied, 2) that his injury would outweigh the injury the Oklahoma
Board of Elections would suffer if the requested injunction was granted, and
3) that the requested injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.161
154. Id.
155. See id. at 1307–08.
156. Id. at 1307 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (“The loss of First Amendment
freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”)).
157. Id. at 1308. Indeed, as the court noted, the very purpose of enshrining constitutional
protections in the Bill of Rights was to prevent “certain individual rights from being taken away by
the will of the majority.” Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1129 (10th Cir. 2012).
161. Id. at 1125.
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The Tenth Circuit, however, took a very different tack in addressing the
most important of the four preliminary injunction factors: whether Awad had
a significant likelihood of success on the merits of his case.162 First, while
the district court had offered an extensive analysis of both Awad’s claim
under the Establishment Clause and his claim under the Free Exercise
Clause, the Tenth Circuit took a more circumscribed approach, merely
Because Awad
considering Awad’s Establishment Clause claim.163
successfully demonstrated the likely invalidity of SQ 755 under the
Establishment Clause, the Tenth Circuit wrote, there was no need to consider
his Free Exercise claim.164
Even more significant, however, was the Tenth Circuit’s rejection of the
Lemon test and its application of another, much more rarely invoked
Establishment Clause tool: the “test” described in Larson v. Valente.165
Quoting Larson, the Tenth Circuit insisted that the Lemon test “applies
[only] to ‘laws affording uniform benefit to all religions, and not to
provisions . . . that discriminate among religions.’”166 In instances where a
state law actually discriminated among religions, on the other hand, the law
must be strictly scrutinized to determine whether “it is ‘closely fitted to the
furtherance of any compelling interest asserted.’”167 Because SQ 755
specifically singled out Islam and sharia law for particular censure, and,
thus, facially “discriminated among religions” under the Larson test, its
validity could only be demonstrated by the existence of a compelling
government interest that SQ 755’s ban on sharia was “closely fitted” to
address.168 The Tenth Circuit, however, ruled that banning sharia was not a
“compelling government interest” of the State of Oklahoma because the
Board of Elections’ inability to point to any case in which sharia was used
indicated that no “actual problem” existed.169 While this holding alone was
enough to show that Awad would likely succeed on the merits of his case
under the Larson test, the court also noted that, even if the application of
sharia did pose some real problem or concern, a complete ban on any
“consideration” of sharia was “hardly an exercise of narrow tailoring.”170

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See id. at 1129.
Id. at 1125.
Id. at 1119.
Id. at 1128.
Id. at 1126 (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982)).
Id. at 1127 (quoting Larson, 456 U.S. at 255).
Id. at 1130–31.
Id. at 1130.
Id. at 1131.
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V. ANALYSIS
At the most basic level, the passage of Oklahoma’s ban on sharia law
raises a number of important questions, only one of which was implicitly
considered in the judicial decisions of the district court and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and some of which went
unconsidered by the courts and by the ban’s advocates. The first question,
implicitly addressed by the courts, is whether or not SQ 755’s proposed ban
on sharia and other forms of international law is constitutional.171 A second,
much broader and as yet unaddressed, question is whether or not a ban on
sharia is even necessary to prevent the dangers or effects that anti-sharia
advocates fear. A third is the question of what effect domestic efforts aimed
at limiting or challenging Islam will have on the United States’ larger
ideological struggle against radical Islamism, as well as what effect such
efforts will have on the loyalty of Muslim-American citizens. This
Comment argues not only that 1) the district court and the Tenth Circuit
reached the correct conclusion with respect to the First Amendment
arguments raised in Awad, but also that 2) the most offensive and dangerous
aspects of radical sharia law are already constitutionally prohibited by
United States law, and that 3) efforts to ban sharia actually harm America’s
ability to provide an ideological alternative to Islamism by encouraging the
perception of an inevitable clash between American and Islamic values.
A. Constitutional Analysis: The Unconstitutionality of SQ 755 Under the
First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
In determining whether to enjoin SQ 755’s certification by the
Oklahoma State Board of Elections, the district court and the Tenth Circuit
spent the most significant portions of their opinions on the question of
Awad’s likely success on the merits.172 Specifically, the courts examined
whether it was more likely than not that, if its provisions were directly
challenged in a future lawsuit, SQ 755 would be struck down as
unconstitutional for violating the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise
Clause, or both.173 Both courts concluded that Awad had a significant
likelihood of successfully challenging the constitutionality of Oklahoma’s
sharia ban if SQ 755 was incorporated into the Oklahoma Constitution.174
While the district and Tenth Circuit courts were analyzing the
unconstitutionality of SQ 755 on the theoretical level required to grant or
deny a preliminary injunction, both courts’ constitutional analyses were
171.
172.
173.
174.
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See Awad, 670 F.3d at 1126; Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1305–07.
See Awad, 670 F.3d at 1131; Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1305–07.
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correct: had SQ 755 been certified and its ban on sharia law incorporated
into the Oklahoma Constitution, this ban would unconstitutionally violate
both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.175
With respect to Awad’s Establishment Clause analysis, the Tenth Circuit
correctly held that, because SQ 755 facially “discriminated among
religions,” any examination of the ballot initiative’s ban on sharia ought to
be analyzed under the Larson test rather than the traditional Lemon test.176
The Supreme Court’s holding in Larson, which has yet to be overruled or
superseded by any later case, stipulates that the Lemon test was “intended to
apply to laws affording a uniform benefit to all religions, and not to
provisions . . . that discriminate among religions.”177 Laws that discriminate
among religions, such as the explicit ban on the application of sharia law
described in SQ 755, are to be examined much more strictly: such a law
“must be invalidated unless it is justified by a compelling governmental
interest, and unless it is closely fitted to further that interest.”178 Under this
analysis, the State of Oklahoma might have had a legitimately compelling
interest in limiting or outlawing some of the actions that are justified or
permitted under extreme interpretations of sharia—such as discrimination or
violence against women, homosexuals, and non-Muslims. However,
banning all applications of sharia law can hardly be considered a narrowly
tailored way to address these legitimate interests.179 Because SQ 755’s ban
on sharia is not narrowly tailored to address the interests cited by the State
of Oklahoma, it cannot withstand the strict scrutiny of the Supreme Court’s
current Establishment Clause jurisprudence.180
Although the Tenth Circuit only addressed Awad’s Establishment
Clause claims, the sharia ban contained in SQ 755 would, as the district
court explained in its opinion, also unconstitutionally violate the Free
Exercise Clause. As discussed above, the current test for analyzing a Free
Exercise claim can be found in the case of Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, in which the Supreme Court held that a law restricting religious
exercise that is not neutral or generally applicable to the public as a whole

175. See supra notes 172–73; see also infra notes 176–84.
176. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982); see Awad, 670 F.3d at 1128.
177. Larson, 456 U.S. at 252.
178. Id. at 247 (citations omitted).
179. Because sharia law can encompass all aspects of a Muslim’s life—providing rules related to
religious and societal behavior, criminal law, and such civil law subjects as testation and contract,
among other things—banning all applications of sharia would needlessly outlaw harmless, and even
beneficial, behavior. See supra notes 52–83 and accompanying text.
180. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 247; see also Awad, 670 F.3d at 1129.
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“must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be
narrowly tailored to advance that interest.”181 Because the text of SQ 755
specifically singles out sharia law for particular censure, the ballot initiative
is neither neutral nor generally applicable, and, thus, it must be analyzed
under the strict scrutiny test outlined in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye.182
SQ 755’s ban on sharia fails under both prongs of this strict scrutiny test:
first, as the trial record indicates, the State of Oklahoma did not produce
sufficient evidence to demonstrate either that a compelling government
interest existed or that the ban was narrowly tailored to address that interest,
whatever it might be;183 second, even if the State of Oklahoma had a
compelling interest in outlawing some of the more harmful and dangerous
aspects of radical sharia law, its attempt to ban sharia law in its entirety is
overbroad and, thus, is not narrowly tailored.184
B. Current Constitutional and Legal Preclusion: The Redundancy of SQ
755 and Other Sharia Bans
Oklahoma’s SQ 755 was not merely unconstitutional and, as will be
discussed below, a potential propaganda victory for Islamist extremists; it
was also entirely unnecessary to outlaw the types of behavior and action that
Oklahoman anti-sharia activists sought to prevent. Although neither the
district court nor the Tenth Circuit explicitly articulate this argument, both
courts implicitly reference it in their discussion of whether or not banning
sharia is a “compelling interest” of the State of Oklahoma.185 As the Tenth
Circuit stated, it could not accept SQ 755’s sharia ban as a compelling
interest because the Oklahoma State Board of Elections did “not identify any
actual problem [that SQ 755 sought] to solve”—indeed, the Board could not
cite “even a single instance where an Oklahoma court had applied sharia
law or used the legal precepts of other nations or cultures, let alone that such
applications or uses had resulted in concrete problems.”186 The Board likely
failed to find an example of sharia’s application not only because no such
application had yet occurred, but also because existing constitutional
interpretations and protections already prevent any such application from
occurring at all.187 Even if we accept the interpretation of sharia law held by

181. 508 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1993); see also supra notes 140–44 and accompanying text.
182. See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1301 (W.D. Okla. 2010).
183. See id. at 1307.
184. See supra notes 52–83, 180 and accompanying text.
185. See Awad, 670 F.3d at 1129–31; Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1306–07.
186. Awad, 670 F.3d at 1130.
187. Andrew Rosenkranz, the Florida Regional Director for the Anti-Defamation League, has
argued that bills banning sharia law (and international law more generally, see infra notes 220–25
and accompanying text) are “wholly redundant as the [individual state] and U.S. constitutions
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Islam’s harshest critics to be true—an acceptance that, as explained above,
fails to account for the diversity of thought between different sects and
schools of Islam—it is likely that banning sharia would still fall outside the
“compelling state interest” realm because the United States Constitution
itself would largely prevent the application of this radical sharia.
Assume, for the sake of argument, that critics of Islam and anti-sharia
activists are correct in their beliefs about the Islamic faith—that MuslimAmericans seek to slowly force Islamic law on America by “entwin[ing] the
West in sharia: first legitimiz[ing] Islamic law in Western eyes; then
establish[ing] the principle that, where applicable, Islamic law can override
existing secular law; and finally, work[ing] to increase the areas of Western
life in which Islamic law is deemed applicable.”188 Even if such a program
of “creeping sharia” was currently being undertaken, and radical Islamists
were truly seeking to establish sharia-compliant parallel societies in the
United States, existing constitutional safeguards would already provide a
significant obstacle to such an endeavor. The Constitution does not exist in
a vacuum, and, ironically, the very constitutional interpretations that, as the
Awad court held, prevent Oklahoma and other states from banning sharia
law outright also allow limitations of radical interpretations of sharia.189
There is a large body of precedent demonstrating that religious beliefs
cannot trump secular United States law, particularly when compelling
societal interests are at stake: neither polygamy nor drug use, for instance,
are exempt from criminal statutes banning such actions merely because they
are engaged in out of religious conviction.190
For all of their gloomy predictions of Islamization in the American
heartland, anti-sharia activists have failed to explain how or why United

already prohibit the unconstitutional application of foreign law[s]” in state judicial systems. Matt
Sedensky, Florida Foreign Law Ban: Measure Banning Shariah, Other Foreign Law Progresses in
Statehouse,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Mar.
2,
2012,
9:48
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/02/florida-foreign-law-ban-shariah_n_1315873.html.
188. ANDREW C. MCCARTHY, THE GRAND JIHAD: HOW ISLAM AND THE LEFT SABOTAGE
AMERICA 94 (2010).
189. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–33
(1993). Under the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye precedent, for instance, actions that would be
lawful religious duties in a country like Taliban-era Afghanistan—for example, killing
homosexuals—could easily and justifiably be outlawed without infringing upon the First
Amendment right of radical Muslims to freely exercise their religion: hate crime legislation is not
specifically directed against the real or perceived religious beliefs of Islamist fundamentalists, but,
rather, is generally applicable to the public as a whole and, thus, does not need to be justified by a
“compelling government interest.” Id. at 531–33.
190. See Emp’t. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877–79 (1990); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 167 (1879).
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States civil and criminal law, supported by over one hundred years of
Supreme Court precedent, would suddenly cease to apply to MuslimAmericans. Under the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye “compelling state
interest” test, current statutes prohibiting polygamy, domestic violence,
homophobic hate crimes, and other harmful conduct would almost certainly
serve as constitutionally-protected checks on the ability of radical Islamists
to institute their extreme interpretations of sharia law.191 Indeed, in the few
judicial cases in which real or perceived Islamic mores and American laws
have, arguably, come into direct conflict, it is the Islamic mores that are laid
aside: in the New Jersey case of S.D. v. M.J.R., for instance, an appellate
court rejected the idea that a Muslim husband’s religious beliefs concerning
the roles of husbands and wives negated the criminal intent necessary to find
him guilty of committing a proven sexual assault.192 It is even less clear how
even more extreme aspects of radical sharia—such as the punishments of
amputation, lashing, and stoning for certain crimes, or the judicial practice
of settling all cases, whether civil or criminal, without a jury—would not run
afoul of constitutional prohibitions on “cruel or unusual punishment” or
constitutional requirements that juries be impaneled for criminal and certain
civil cases.193
Anti-sharia activists respond to such criticisms by insisting that
immediate application of radical sharia’s most extreme aspects is not the
goal of American Islamists—that, instead, Islamists seek to gradually erode
constitutional prohibitions on their more radical practices, slowly causing
the American public and courts to accept the application of sharia policies in
ever-broadening circumstances.194 The success of such a strategy, however,
seems unlikely; as described above, the Constitution’s extensive protections
against many of the more troublesome aspects of radical sharia law are so
wide-ranging that they are unlikely to be dramatically changed without a
constitutional amendment. As of 2010, however, the Muslim population of
the United States was only about 2.6 million—less than 1% of the nation’s
population.195 In other words, Muslim-Americans are in no demographic
position to radically alter the United States Constitution, even assuming that
they wanted to—an assumption that is not borne out by recent data, which

191. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 520, 531–33; see also supra note 185.
192. 415 N.J. Super. 417, 427–29, 431 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). While anti-sharia
activists are certainly justified in their disgust at the lower court’s culturally relativistic ruling in this
case, supra note 19, the appellate court’s decision shows that United States law will not accept such
relativism and will continue to apply to all citizens regardless of their religious convictions. Id.
193. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII, VIII.
194. See MCCARTHY, supra note 188, at 94.
195. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, THE FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL MUSLIM
POPULATION: PROJECTIONS FOR 2010–2030 (2011), available at http://www.pewforum.org/TheFuture-of-the-Global-Muslim-Population.aspx.
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indicates that a vast majority of Muslim-Americans are not interested in
establishing a parallel court system of sharia tribunals.196
Within the context of current legal prohibitions on violence and
discrimination, Oklahoma’s attempt to ban sharia law through the passage
of SQ 755 was not only blatantly unconstitutional, as both the district court
and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held197—it was also redundant. SQ
755 would not have made current prohibitions on such things as domestic
violence; spousal rape; discrimination based on gender, sexual orientation,
or religion; and brutal corporal punishment any more likely to be enforced.
Instead, the blanket ban on sharia only interfered with far more benign
activities—such as sharia-based family arbitration, contract formation, and
testation—that even the most non-radical Muslims might choose to engage
in.198 Banning these sorts of activities with legislation that has little, if any,
effect on the most brutal aspects of radical sharia law is not only antithetical
to America’s cherished values and freedoms, but also, as will be discussed
immediately below, needlessly antagonizes law-abiding Muslim-American
citizens.
C. Diffusing the “Clash of Civilizations”: Awad and Counter-Extremism
Policy
Part of the rationale behind anti-Islamic initiatives like Oklahoma’s SQ
755 is the global rise in Islamic extremism that has occurred over the past
thirty years, a phenomenon that has spread from stereotypical hotbeds of
radicalism, like the Palestinian Territories, Egypt, and Afghanistan, to
Southeast Asia, Africa, and even small-town America.199 This rise in
196. Omar Sacirbey, American Muslims Don’t Want Shariah, According to Study by University of
Windsor, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 2012, 6:48 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/31/
american-muslims-dont-want-shariah_n_1245303.html.
197. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1129–31 (10th Cir. 2012); Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp.
2d 1298, 1305–08 (W.D. Okla. 2010). See also supra notes 141–70 and accompanying text.
198. Indeed, the Awad case itself was, at the most fundamental level, concerned with Muneer
Awad’s rights of testation, rather than the more extreme aspects of radical sharia with which the
Oklahoma voting populace was, no doubt, much more concerned. See Complaint Seeking a Temp.
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 6–8, Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D.
Okla. 2010) (No. CIV-10-1186-M.
199. While the origins of modern Islamist fundamentalism can be traced back nearly a hundred
years to the religo-political ideology of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna, militant
Islamism, such as the type exhibited by al-Qaeda, is more directly inspired by the Afghan-Soviet
War of the 1980s and the writings of Abdullah Azzam, the “Godfather of Jihad.” Chris Suellentrop,
Abdullah Azzam: The Godfather of Jihad, Slate (Apr. 16, 2002, 2:26 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/assessment/2002/04/abdullah_azzam.html. Since
its formation in the late 1980s, al-Qaeda has spread this militant ideology across the Middle East, to
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violence, terrorism, and extremist interpretations of Islam, the argument
goes, proves that Islam itself is inherently violent, and, thus, that legislative
checks on Islam and Islamic ideology are necessary to prevent the spread of
extremism and to protect women, minorities, and other groups that are
frequent targets of Islamist extremists.200 This anti-Islam argument,
embodied in the immediate case by the passage of Oklahoma’s SQ 755,
plays into the hands of al-Qaeda in two ways. First, it encourages and
perpetuates the infamous “clash of civilizations” thesis—the idea that
inherent differences between Western and Islamic cultures must necessarily
lead to at least some level of conflict between the two.201 Second, it
inadvertently, and foolishly, acknowledges al-Qaeda and other radical
Muslims who share its ideology to be the true arbiters of Islamic thought and
theology.202 In this context, the decision in Awad must be viewed not only as

Africa, and even to Southeast Asia, establishing localized al-Qaeda branches—such as al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda in Iraq, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb—and enlisting the aid
of indigenous, affiliated terrorist groups—such as the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, or alShabab in Somalia. See generally JOHN ROLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AL QAEDA AND
AFFILIATES: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, GLOBAL PRESENCE, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
(2011), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41070.pdf. In the United States, however, counterterrorism efforts after 9/11 have forced al-Qaeda to focus more of its efforts on convincing MuslimAmericans to undertake so-called “lone wolf” attacks on American targets. See Al Qaeda Magazine
Encourages “Lone” Wolf Attacks on Western Infrastructure and Public Figures, INVESTIGATIVE
PROJECT ON TERRORISM (Nov. 10, 2009, 1:16 PM), http://www.investigativeproject.org/1507/alqaeda-magazine-encourages-lone-wolf-attacks-on. Unfortunately, a small number of MuslimAmerican citizens have answered al-Qaeda’s call. See CHARLES KURZMAN, TRIANGLE CTR. ON
TERRORISM & HOMELAND SEC., MUSLIM-AMERICAN TERRORISM IN THE DECADE SINCE 9/11
(2012), https://www.google.com/url?q=http://tcths.sanford.duke.edu/documents/Kurzman_MuslimAmerican_Terrorism_in_the_Decade_Since_9_11.pdf&sa=U&ei=yZnwUI7WE6qYiQLR2YDoBw
&ved=0CAcQFjAA&client=internal-uds-cse&usg=AFQjCNFonCiiQfGDsLpXLHZQUs__z7_TeQ.
200. See Geller, NY Times Con Job, supra note 14 (stating that Islam is “the most antisemitic,
genocidal ideology in the world”).
201. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, at
22–35.
202. As numerous writers, reporters, and academics have pointed out, Osama bin Laden himself
had no formal Islamic training. See ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL QAEDA: GLOBAL NETWORK OF
TERROR 86–87 (2002) (noting that bin Laden not only “was not trained as a religious scholar,” but,
in fact, “had no formal training in Islam apart from what he had gleaned from his own
reading . . . .”); Eric Marrapodi, Bin Laden’s Theology a Radical Break with Traditional Islam, CNN
BELIEF BLOG (May 4, 2011, 3:00 AM), http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2011/05/04/bin-ladenstheology/ (discussing bin Laden’s lack of religious authority with a number of prominent
academics—including Ebrahim Moosa, a professor of religion and Islamic studies at Duke
University; John Esposito, a professor of religion and international affairs at Georgetown
University’s School of Foreign Service; and Aftab Malik, a global expert on Muslim affairs at the
United Nations Alliance of Civilization). Indeed, even Islamic religious scholars were adamant that
bin Laden and al-Qaeda did not speak for Islam. Prominent American Islamic scholar Hamza
Yusuf, for instance, derided bin Laden’s attempts to use religious exhortations and Islamic fatwas to
frame his radical views:
According to Islamic law, [Osama bin Laden] does not represent legitimate state
authority. He has no authority to declare war on anybody . . . . [I]t is very dangerous for
us to say that Osama bin Laden represents Muslim law because he does not. He does not
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a powerful defense of the United States’ principles and ideals, but also as an
essential tool in the United States’ global ideological struggle against radical
Islamists.
The idea that civilizational and cultural differences must, almost
necessarily, lead to conflict between the West and the Muslim world—first
proposed by political theorist Samuel Huntington in the early 1990s203—has
come to be an accepted trope amongst radical Islamists.204 The extremist
group Hizb ut-Tahrir has published its own pamphlet explaining the
“inevitability” of this clash, and Osama bin Laden himself supported and
encouraged the “clash of civilizations” thesis.205 So far, however, a broader
acceptance of this theory within the Muslim world has largely failed to

have that authority. The only people who can declare jihad are legitimate rulers, and
none of these groups has that legitimacy.
SCOTT KUGLE, REBEL BETWEEN SPIRIT AND LAW: AHMAD ZARRUQ, SAINTHOOD, AND AUTHORITY
IN ISLAM 21 (2006) (quoting Hamza Yusuf). Similarly, Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, a prominent
Pakistani Islamic scholar and religious leader, published a spirited, 512-page fatwa condemning
suicide bombings and terrorism—al-Qaeda’s most prominent tactics—as un-Islamic. MUHAMMAD
TAHIR-UL-QADRI, FATWA ON TERRORISM AND SUICIDE BOMBINGS (2010). When United States
policy-makers, such as the Oklahoma legislature, castigate the so-called “Islam” of Osama bin
Laden and other Islamists by attempting to limit Muslim-Americans’ freedom of religion, they
inadvertently reinforce the false perception that it is bin Laden—and not the Muslims and Islamic
scholars who oppose him—who offers the “correct” interpretation of the Islamic faith.
203. See generally Huntington, supra note 201 (outlining Huntington’s theory of the “clash of
civilizations”).
204. See Mordechai Kedar, The Clash of Values: Islamists and the 1994 UN International
Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, in MIDDLE EASTERN SOCIETIES AND THE
WEST: ACCOMMODATION OR CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS? 169–73 (Meir Litvak ed., 2006).
205. See HATMIYYAT SIRA’A UL-HADHARAT [THE INEVITABILITY OF THE CLASH OF
CIVILISATION] 28–62 (2002), available at http://www.e-prism.org/images/clashofcivilisation.pdf.
See also PETER L. BERGEN, THE OSAMA BIN LADEN I KNOW: AN ORAL HISTORY OF AL QAEDA’S
LEADER 322 (2006); Osama bin Laden, Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the
Land of the Two Holy Places, PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 23, 1996, 12:21 PM),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html; Osama bin Laden, Text of
World Islamic Front’s Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, INVESTIGATIVE
PROJECT ON TERRORISM (Feb. 23, 1998), http://www.investigativeproject.org/document/id/180.
Osama bin Laden endorsed the clash of civilizations thesis in an interview with the Arabic-language
news network Al Jazeera conducted shortly after 9/11, stating that there was “no doubt” that he
supported and believed in the existence of this civilizational clash. BERGEN, supra, at 322. Indeed,
the idea of a civilizational clash between the United States, in conjunction with its allies (particularly
the Jewish state of Israel), has been present since bin Laden’s earliest anti-American writings. See
bin Laden, Declaration of War, supra (accusing a “Zionist-Crusader Alliance” of seeking to occupy
the Arabian Peninsula and of exploiting and murdering Muslims throughout the Middle East). Bin
Laden later expanded his anti-American vision, making his perception of a clash of civilizations
even more explicit by issuing a fatwa declaring that “kill[ing] . . . Americans and their allies” was
“an individual duty for every Muslim” in every country throughout the world. See bin Laden, Text
of World Islamic Front’s Statement, supra.
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materialize: while tensions concerning the proper balance between liberal
values and Islamic traditions and identity are certainly present within many
Muslim societies, research has shown that the majority of Muslims across
the globe support democratic institutions and have rejected the violence and
extremism propounded by al-Qaeda.206 Thus, one of bin Laden’s primary
goals was to inflame cultural differences in order to persuade Muslims that
the West, led by the United States, was their inveterate enemy, an opponent
of their Islamic values that must be violently confronted.207 Even though bin
Laden himself has been eliminated, this strategy remains a central concern
of al-Qaeda: an al-Qaeda strategy paper discovered in Germany, for
instance, reveals that the organization “expects . . . growing fear among the
general population and increasing reprisals on the part of the security
[forces] will marginalize Muslims.”208 “As a result of such escalation,” the
paper continues, “Muslims will join the Holy War in ever larger
numbers.”209 The strategy described in this paper is indicative not just of alQaeda’s goals in Germany, but, indeed, of the organization’s global
aspirations: if Western governments marginalize their Muslim citizens by
attacking their faith, calling their loyalty into question, or subjecting them to
unwarranted or unlawful harassment by police or security forces, these
governments will inadvertently encourage both the “clash of civilizations”
perception and the very radicalization that al-Qaeda itself seeks to foment.210

206. See Paul Marshall, Introduction: The Rise of Extreme Shari’a, in RADICAL ISLAM’S RULES:
THE WORLDWIDE SPREAD OF EXTREME SHARI’A LAW 2 (Paul Marshall ed., 2005); Steven Kull,
Muslims and America: Internalizing the Clash of Civilizations, WORLDPUBLICOPINION.ORG (June 7,
2010), http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/663.php?nid=&id=&p
nt=663.
207. After bin Laden’s death at the hands of Unites States Navy SEALS, for instance, documents
captured from his Abbottabad compound revealed that he was deeply concerned with portraying alQaeda’s image in such a way as to instill and reinforce the perception among Muslims that they were
“in a holy war with America.” Seized Bin Laden Writings Yield New Details, Rwandan Woman
Convicted of Genocide, PBS NEWSHOUR: THE RUNDOWN (June 24, 2011, 8:27 AM),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2011/06/seized-materials-reveal-bin-laden-ties-rwandanwoman-convicted-of-genocide.html (quoting the Associated Press).
208. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Al Qaeda’s Strategy Paper on Its War of Attrition, GUNPOWDER
& LEAD (Jan. 24, 2012), http://gunpowderandlead.wordpress.com/2012/01/24/al-qaedas-strategypaper-on-its-war-of-attrition/ (quoting Frank Jansen, Al Qaida plant Geiselnahmen in Deutschland
BKA findet Hinweise [Germany’s Federal Office of Criminal Investigation Finds Evidence of Al
Qaida’s Plans to Take Hostages in Germany], TAGESSPIEGEL (Berlin) (Jan. 23, 2012, 12:00 AM),
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/al-qaida-plant-geiselnahmen-in-deutschland-bka-findethinweise/6097086.html).
209. Id.
210. An example of this kind of avoidable cycle can be found in an incident that occurred in the
United States in January 2011: in response to what it perceived as unjustified police investigation
and harassment of Muslim communities, CAIR, the Council of American-Islamic Relations,
published an online poster-graphic with the headline “Build a Wall of Resistance,” extolling
Muslim-Americans not to talk to the FBI. Todd Starnes, CAIR Says Poster Warning Against
Helping
FBI
is
Misinterpreted,
FOX
NEWS
(Jan.
13,
2011),
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Anti-Islamic legislation, such as Oklahoma’s ban on the application or
consideration of sharia law, must be analyzed with al-Qaeda’s—and other
radical Islamists’—global strategy in mind. Far from seriously addressing
the real or perceived threats that anti-sharia activists fear, Oklahoma’s SQ
755 and other, similar measures, likely increase Islamic radicalization by
perpetuating a false dichotomy between “Western” and “Islamic” values.
There is a profound difference between the sharia propounded by Islamist
extremists and that followed by the vast majority of Muslims, both in the
United States and across the globe.211 For a state like Oklahoma to condense
thirteen centuries of Islamic thought into one monolithic “Sharia” not only
ignores a wealth of diversity within the global Islamic community; it also
encourages the very civilizational rift that al-Qaeda and other radical groups
still seek to beget.212
As has been described in the foregoing Comment, sharia law is not so
much a specific legal code as it is a way of life for adherents to the Islamic
faith. For this reason, Paul Marshall, a leading scholar in the study of
religious freedom, writes:
[C]riticism of the notion of shari’a often sounds strange to
Muslims, even though they might disagree with stoning adulterous
women or cutting the hands off thieves. Criticizing shari’a as such,
as distinct from “extreme shari’a,” can sound like a criticism of
“justice” or “rights” or “the right” or “the good.”213
Far from merely criticizing sharia, as the district court points out,
Oklahoma’s attempt to ban sharia altogether “conveys a message of

http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/01/13/cair-says-anti-fbi-poster-misinterpreted/. When the graphic
was discovered and publicized, the perception created by the poster—that Muslim-Americans had
something to hide and were being encouraged not to cooperate with law enforcement—resulted in a
public outcry that eventually caused CAIR to remove the graphic from its website. See Starnes,
supra. The graphic was later referenced by Peter King, a Republican Representative from New
York who, as chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, has held a number of hearings
on Islamic radicalization in America, as evidence that organizations like CAIR are not doing enough
to prevent homegrown Islamic radicalization. See Michael Warren, Rep. Peter King Blasts CAIR’s
“Don’t Talk to the FBI” Poster, WKLY. STANDARD (Jan. 18, 2011, 4:16 PM),
http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/cair-requests-chapter-remove-poster_536695.html.
This
incident may not have had particularly dramatic consequences, but it is a textbook example of the
ways in which false perceptions can lead to bitterness and mistrust for both Muslims and nonMuslims alike.
211. See BHALA, supra note 52, at xxxiv, 1377–82.
212. See supra notes 200–06 and accompanying text.
213. Marshall, supra note 206, at 1.
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disapproval of [the entire Islamic] faith.”214 Indeed, Awad’s contentions that
SQ 755 “conveys an official government message of disapproval and
hostility toward his religious beliefs” and sends a message to MuslimAmerican citizens that they are “outsider[s and] not [] full member[s] of the
political community” are feelings that are likely shared by the wider
Muslim-American community as a whole.215 At a time when domestic
radicalization and the attendant risk of homegrown terrorism are on the rise,
these are precisely the kind of messages that American policy-makers should
not be conveying to the nation’s Muslim-American citizens.216
In refusing to allow the certification of SQ 755 and, thus, preventing its
subsequent incorporation into Oklahoma’s constitution, the Awad courts did
not merely prevent an unconstitutional and redundant law from going into
effect.217 They also, perhaps just as importantly, prevented the Oklahoma
electorate from inadvertently handing a significant propaganda victory and
recruiting tool to al-Qaeda and other Islamist extremists.218
VI. IMPACT
As the first judicial examination of state attempts to ban or limit the
application of sharia law in American courts, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals’ judgment in Awad will likely have a significant impact on further
legal controversies that arise with respect to this issue. Most significantly,
the Awad judgment demonstrates that facially discriminatory legislation—
e.g., legislation that textually specifies limitations on Islam or sharia—will
not survive constitutional scrutiny.219 Because of its emphasis on textual
language and intent, however, the Awad decision has not caused states
attempting to ban sharia to abandon their efforts.220 Instead, state legislators
have begun changing the language of their legislation in an attempt to

214. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (W.D. Okla. 2010).
215. Id. at 1303.
216. See JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AMERICAN JIHADIST TERRORISM:
COMBATING A COMPLEX THREAT (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf.
In the past two and a half years, between May 2009 and October 2011, thirty-two “homegrown”
jihadist terrorist plots have been disrupted, compared to twenty-one such plots disrupted during the
seven and a half years between 9/11 in 2001and April 2009. Id.
217. See supra notes 172–98 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 199–217 and accompanying text.
219. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1126–30 (10th Cir. 2012); Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at
1305–08.
220. Arizona, for instance, successfully passed legislation prohibiting the application of “foreign
law” in 2011—after the district court’s initial decision in Awad. Raftery, supra note 26. More
recently, two members of Virginia’s House of Delegates have introduced a similar bill that would
ban the application of “foreign law” in any Virginia court. See H.B. 631, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Va. 2012), available at http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?121+ful+HB631.
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strategically avoid “singling out” Islam as Oklahoma’s SQ 755 did.221 One
popular strategy, which has already been employed by three states, is to use
the “American Laws for American Courts” draft legislation created by
vehemently anti-sharia lawyer David Yerushalmi for an organization called
the American Public Policy Alliance.222 This draft legislation places a
blanket ban on the application of “foreign law[s], legal code[s], or
system[s]” by forbidding courts and other state tribunals from basing their
decisions on any source of law that “would not grant the parties affected by
the ruling or decision the same fundamental liberties, rights, and privileges
granted under the U.S. and [State] Constitutions.”223
To date, no challenge has been raised against state laws modeled on the
“American Laws for American Courts” legislation.224 While it, thus,
remains to be seen whether such laws will be upheld as constitutional, it is
likely that, like the blatant sharia ban in SQ 755, these back-handed attempts
to limit the application of sharia will also fail to pass constitutional
muster.225 Such laws will likely result in confusion with respect to which
foreign laws will be explicitly barred from consideration. Under the United
States Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, federal law, which includes
international law, in the form of treaties between the United States and other
countries, is the supreme law of the land.226 While a ban on “foreign” law
could be interpreted to exclude foreign precepts constitutionally
incorporated into United States domestic law, the distinction between

221. Indeed, this is the very strategy that anti-sharia activists have advised states to follow in the
wake of the Awad judgment. See Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., American Laws for American Courts:
Preserving the Constitution Means Rejecting Shariah, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jan/23/american-laws-for-american-courts/. Arizona’s
legislation followed this general strategy. See id. More recent legislation, such as Virginia’s House
Bill 631, also appears to be using more generalized language in an attempt to evade Awad’s
prohibitions. See Va. H.B. 631.
222. See American Laws for American Courts, AM. PUB. POL’Y ALLIANCE,
http://publicpolicyalliance.org/?page_id=38 (last visited Jan. 8, 2013). See also Gaffney, supra note
221 (“While Shariah would certainly be covered by [American Laws for American Courts
initiatives], it is not singled out for special treatment. No challenge has been mounted thus far in any
of the states where it is the law today. And some 20 other states are actively considering ALAC’s
adoption in the current legislative session.”).
223. American Laws for American Courts, supra note 222.
224. See Frank Gaffney, Jr., American Laws for American Courts, CTR. FOR SECURITY POL’Y
(Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/p18912.xml.
225. See generally Penny M. Venetis, The Unconstitutionality of Oklahoma’s SQ 755 and Other
Provisions Like It That Bar State Courts from Considering International Law, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
189 (2011) (explaining the unconstitutionality of legal provisions that seek to ban the application or
consideration of international law).
226. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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applicable and inapplicable foreign law will not always be clear; indeed, “a
general ban on international law may be a constitutional violation if that ban
is interpreted to include restrictions on the consideration of treaties or other
international agreements that the United States has entered or adopted
pursuant to the U.S. Constitution.”227 Legal provisions like the American
Laws for American Courts initiatives may also unconstitutionally interfere
with judicial independence by placing legislative constraints on judicial
decision-making.228 Finally, policy considerations, such as interference with
principles of Full Faith and Credit, problems of comity, and the threat of
unintended consequences, should cause states to think twice before
implementing these types of blanket bans on international or foreign law.229
VII. CONCLUSION
The significance of the Awad v. Ziriax decision cannot be overstated. In
a world in which the United States faces a continuing ideological struggle
with radical Islamists—a struggle that will likely gain an even broader
significance as Islamist political groups wield greater power in a post-Arab
Spring Middle East—it is imperative that the country maintains its
fundamental values by protecting the rights of all American citizens to
worship freely and to practice their religion without public approbation or
government interference. It is equally imperative that American policymakers do not inadvertently reinforce the Islamist “clash of civilizations”
narrative by positing an inherent dichotomy between Western and Islamic
values.230 In light of these considerations, the decision in Awad v. Ziriax
represents a victory not only for American values, but also for American
credibility within the wider Islamic world.
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